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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 34
EVIDENCE - PRIVILEGED CONIMUNICTION BETwEEN ATTORNEY AND CLIENT -
PUBLICATION OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION. -
An attorney and his client sought to restrain a New York joint legislative
committee from making public a tape recording of a private consultation
between the attorney and client in the county jail. The Court of Appeals of
New York, three judges dissenting, held that the attomey-client privilege
extends only to testimonial compulsion, and publication of a confidential coin-
munication by a state Legislative committee cannot be restrained. Lanza v.
New York State Joint Legislative Committee, 3 N.Y.2d 92, 14.3 N.E.2d 772
(1957).
The privilege of confidential communication between attorney and client
originated to protect the oath and honor of the attorney,' but since the 1700's
it has belonged exclusively to the client 2 to provide him freedom from
apprehension in consulting a legal advisor.:' The privilege is based on the fact
that any person ought to able, fully and freely, to disclose all the facts
to his lawyer knowing that what he tells his lawyer cannot, over his objection,
be extorted in court from the lawyer's lips. 4 Many states have enacted laws
which protect a confidential communication between an attorney and his
client. 5
If the communication between attorney and client is subject to being nmade
public,; or used in evidence against the client,7 it will greatly jeopardize the
administration of justice. In the recent case of Hurt v. Oklahoma,8 Judge Nix
stated that a great injustice was done by allowing an attorney to testify against
a previous client as to privileged material. In the Ex parte Snyder9 case "-he
court held that failure to allow a defendant confined in jail to have private
consultation with his counsel violates his constitutional rights.
The court's decision in the instant case is based upon a New York
statute' 0 which does seal the lips of the attorney and affords a privilege
against testimonial compulsion, unless waived by the client.i The purpose of
making the recording public was for future legislation and not for testimonial
evidence, therefore the court held that-the statute did not apply.
If an attorney and his client are deprived of absolute privacy while in
jail or prison it will greatly hinder public justice.- It is submitted that public
1. See Taylor v. Blacklow, 3 Bing N.C. 236, 249, 132 Eng. Rep. 401 (C.P. 1836).
2. See Duchess of Kingston's case, 20 How. St. Tr. 586 (1776).
3. Ammesley v. Earl of Anglesea, 17 How. St. Tr. 1139 at 1224-5 (1743). For a good
discussion of the history of attorney-client privilege see, Radin, The Privilege of Confidential
Communication between Lawyer and Client, 16 Calif. L. Rev. 487 (1928).
4. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2295 (3d ed. 1940).
5. Id. § 2292.
6. See Foster v. Buchele, 213 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. 1948).
7. See Carlisle v. Bennett, 268 N.Y. 212, 197 N.E. 220 (1935).
8. 312 P.2d 169, 184 (Okla. 1957) (concurring opinion).
9. 62 Cal. App. 697, 217 Pac. 777 (1923).
10. Civil Practice Act, §§ 353, 354; Section 353 provides that an attorney (and his
employees) "shall not be allowed to disclose a communication, made by his client to him,
or his advice thereon, in the course of his professional employment." Section 354 states:
"The last three sections apply to any examination of a person as a witness
11. State v. Toscano, 13 N.J. 418, 100 A.2d 170 (1953).
12. See Ex parte Rider, 50 Cal. App. 797, 195 Pac. 965 (1920). "The right of an
accused, confined in jail or other place of detention pending a trial of the charge against
him, to have an opportunity to consult freely with his counsel without any third person,
whose presence is obiectionable to the accused, being present to hear what passes between
the accused and his counsel, is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the American
criminal law-a right that no legislature or court can ignore or violate."
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policy and the preservation of attorney-client privilege, indicate that the
judgment in the instant case should have been reversed.
GORDON 0. HOBEG
HUSBAND AND WIFE - TORTS - HUSBAND'S RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST WIFE.
-In an action by a husband against his wife for injuries sustained due to
her negligent operation of a motor vehicle, the Supreme Court of Arkansas
held, that a statute providing that every married woman shall have the right
to sue and be sued as though a femme sole, gives the husband a right of
action against his wife. Leach v. Leach, 300 S.W.2d 15 (Ark. 1957).
At common law, because of the fiction that husband and wife were one,
it was held that neither spouse could maintain an action against the other
sounding in tort.2 Married Women's Acts have been passed in all American
jurisdictions, primarily to secure to a married woman a separate legal identity
and a separate legal estate in her own property.:' The decisions of the appellate
courts of the nation are in hopeless conflict in the results they have reached
as to the effect of these acts, even when the statutory language before them
has been identical or substantially so.
4
The majority of American courts hold that the Married Women's Acts
have'left unchanged the common law rule that neither spouse could maintain
an action in tort against the other.5 The reasons usually given for denying
the action are that statutes in derogation of the common law should be
strictly construed,e, public policy is against disturbing domestic tranquility,-
1. Ark. Stat. § 55-401 (1947): "Every married woman and every woman who may
in the future become married, shall have all the rights to contract and be contracted with,
to sue and be sued, and in law and equity shall enjoy all rights and be subjected to all
the laws of this State, as though she were a femme sole; provided, it is expressly declared
to be the intention of this act (section) to remove all statutory disabilities of narried
women as well as common law disabilities, such as the disability to act as executrix as
provided by Sect. 6 of Kirby's Digest (Sect. 62-205), and all other statutory disabilities."
2. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61,
100 So. 591 (1924); Leonardi v. Leonardi, 21 Ohio App. 110, 153 N.E. 93 (1925);
Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526, 527 (1932) (dictum).
3. E.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917).
4. McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d. 940, 943 (1943) (dictum).
5. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Comment, 22 Yale L.J. 250 (1913);
Spector v. Weisman, 40 F.2d 792 (D.C. Cir. 1930); Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 Pac.
219 (1909); Ferguson v. Davis, 48 Del. 299, 102 A.2d 707 (1954); Webster v. Snyder,
103 Fla. 1131, 138 So. 755 (1932); Eddleman v. Eddleman, 183 Ga. 766, 189 S.E. 833,
836 (1937) (dictum); Himdman v. Holmes, 4 Ill.App.2d 779, 124 N.E.2d 344 (1955);
In re Dolmage's Estate, 203 Iowa 231, 212 N.W. 553 (1927); Sink v. Sink, 172 Kan. 217,
239 P.2d 933 (1952); Edwards v. Royal Indemnity Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191,
193 (1935) (dictum); Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 24 Am. Rep. 27 (1877); Fursten-
burg v..Furstenburg, 152 Md. 247, 136 Atl. 534 (1927); Lubowitz v. Taines, 293 Mass. 39,
198 N.E. 320 (1936); Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W. 287 (1898);
Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 107 N.W. 1047 (1906); Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61,
100 So. 591 (1924); Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 177 S.W. 382 (1915); Conley v.
Conley, 92 Mont. 425, 15 P.2d 922 (1932); Emerson v. Western Seed & Irrigation Co.,
116 Neb. 180, 216 N.W. 297 (1927); Von Laszewski v. Von Laszewski, 99 N.J. Eq. 25,
133 Atl. 179 (1926); Romero v. Romero, 58 N.M. 201, 269 P.2d 748 (1954); Kaczorow-
ski v. Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 184 All. 633, 665 (1936) (dictum); Oken v. Oken, 44
R.I. 291, 117 Ail. '357 (1922); Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 179 S.W. 628
(1915); Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex. 281 (1886); Comstock v. Comstock, 106 Vt. 50,
169 Atl. 903 (1934); Keister v. Keister, 123 Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315 (1918); Schultz v.
Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 118 Pac. 629 (1911); Poling v. Poling, 116 W.Va. 187, 179
S.E. 604 (1935); McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940 (1943).
6. See, e.g., McKinney v. McKinney, supra note 5.
7. Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N.W. 624 (1920); Longendyke v. Longen-
dyke, 44 Barb: 367 (N.Y. 1863); Prosser, Torts, § 99, 903 (1955).
